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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JIM F. CRITTENDEN,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 970091-CA

v.
Priority No. 15

ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the district court's final order
granting summary judgment for defendant, denying summary judgment
for plaintiff, and dismissing the case. Jurisdiction lies within
this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996), as
the appeal was poured over from the Supreme Court of Utah by
order dated February 10, 1997.

ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the district court correctly hold that plaintiff's due

process rights were not violated by the manner of his
pretermination hearing?
This issue was raised in the amended complaint's third cause
of action (R. 570-69, 11 16-19).x

!

The court granted summary

The district court paginated the record in this case
forward from the last page of the original complaint, thereby
numbering each document backward. For this reason, references to
sequential pages of the record will run from higher to lower
numbers.

judgment for the school district on this issue in its September
5, 1996 ruling (R. 589-85).
Standard of Review:

Under Utah R. Civ. P. 56,

[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because
entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law,
no deference is due the trial court's determination of
the issues presented. However, [the reviewing court]
may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground
available to the trial court, even if it is not one
relied on below.

Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993)
(citations omitted).

Moreover, "[t]his nondeferential standard

of review also applies to the threshold issue of whether there
are no material issues of fact such that summary judgment is in
order." Brown v. Weisr 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App. 1994).
2.

Did the district court correctly conclude that

plaintiff was not entitled to early retirement benefits?
This issue was raised in the amended complaintf s fourth
cause of action (R. 569-68, 11 20-27).

The court granted summary

judgment for the school district on this issue in its September
5, 1996 ruling (R. 585-82).
Standard of Review:

The standard of review for this issue

is the same as that cited above.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes,
and rules pertinent to the issues before the Court is contained
in the body of this brief.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition
Below
Plaintiff, a former employee of defendant, Alpine School

District, filed this action in January, 1993, alleging that in
terminating his employment for misuse of school district
resources, defendant had breached his contract of employment,
terminated him in a wrongful manner, denied his right to due
process of law, and wrongfully precluded him from early
retirement (R. 6-1) . After the school district answered the
complaint (R. 13-10), plaintiff filed a motion for summary
judgment (R. 119-18) supported by a memorandum (R. 129-20) and an
affidavit (R. 134-30).

The school district also filed a motion

for summary judgment (R. 163-62) and supporting memorandum
(R. 309-164).
The district court held a hearing on the motions on August
28, 1996 (R. 559, 613-6762) at which the court granted plaintiff
leave to file an amended complaint (R. 671) . The amended
complaint was filed on August 30, 1996 (R. 572-66), as was the
school district's amended answer (R. 565-61), and a second
hearing was held the same day (R. 577; R. 677-704).

On September

5, 1996, the district court entered a lengthy ruling granting
summary judgment for the school district on all issues (R. 59580).

The court filed a separate order and judgment dismissing

2

Unlike the other documents of record, the two hearing
transcripts in this case are numbered sequentially from beginning
to end.
3

the action on October 1, 1996 (R. 600-599).

This appeal followed

(R. 604-03).

B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
Plaintiff was a long-term employee of Alpine School District

who was serving in the administrative capacity of Director of
Transportation at the time of his termination (R. 595, 11 1-2).
On June 5, 1991, he met with Assistant Superintendent Gary
Keetch, who questioned him about his use of district resources
for private benefit (R. 594, 1 3). In reply to Mr. Keetchfs
specific questions, plaintiff acknowledged using district
resources to benefit himself and another employee (R. 594, 1 5).
When asked whether he had used district resources to benefit his
son, he replied "that this use of funds was a mistake" (±dU . At
the end of the meeting, plaintiff was directed to go home and
await the district's decision on a course of action (isLJ .
Later that day, in a second meeting with Mr. Keetch,
plaintiff was provided a letter which he read in Mr. Keetchfs
presence (R. 594, H

6-7). The letter, signed by Susan Stone,

another assistant superintendent, advised plaintiff that he was
immediately suspended without pay and would be terminated
effective fifteen days later (R. 594, 1 8; R. 275) . The letter
further advised plaintiff of the procedure for obtaining a
hearing in review of the termination decision (R. 594, 1 8;
R. 275). Plaintiff sought post-termination review, and a daylong hearing was held on September 23, 1991 (R. 594, 1 9). The
termination was upheld the following month (R. 593, 1 10).
4

On June 6, 1991, the day after he received the termination
letter, plaintiff notified the school district that he wanted to
take early retirement under the district's policy no. 4752
(R. 585; R. 274). The request was made after the deadline
imposed by the policy (R. 585-84; R. 272).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Due process requires that before a public employee is
terminated for cause, he must be given oral or written notice of
the basis for termination and an opportunity to respond.

These

measures serve only as an initial check on mistaken decisions,
ensuring that there are reasonable grounds to believe the basis
to be true. Although plaintiff claims that his due process
rights were violated by the school district's pretermination
procedures, the undisputed evidence shows otherwise: before the
district reached its termination decision, plaintiff met with an
assistant superintendent, was questioned about three individual
acts of misconduct, admitted to two of them, and asserted an
explanation for the third.

In a second meeting the same day, he

was given a letter which specified the reasons for the
termination decision and advised him of his right to posttermination review.

Pretermination due process demands no more.

Qualification for early retirement under the school
district's policy no. 4752 depends on meeting several
requirements.

Although, as plaintiff correctly asserts, he had

the requisite age and experience to qualify, he did not notify
5

the district of his request for early retirement until June 6,
1991, more than three months after the policy's mandatory March 1
deadline.
grounds:

The school district denied the request, citing two
the fact that plaintiff did not retire but was, in

fact, suspended and under notification of involuntary termination
for cause; and plaintiff's failure to comply with the March 1
notification date. While the issue of timeliness was not
addressed in the summary judgment memoranda, the court inquired
about it in the August 28, 1996 hearing on the summary judgment
motions, and it was the primary topic of a second hearing two
days later.

Therefore, any reliance on the issue by the district

court was entirely appropriate.

Moreover, because the record

evidence supports a determination of untimeliness, this Court
could affirm the lower court's decision on the basis of
untimeliness even if the timeliness issue had been neither raised
nor relied on below.
The district court also found that plaintiff did not
establish the applicability of the school district's early
retirement policy to employees in his position:
and facing termination.

under suspension

On appeal, plaintiff attempts to escape

the court's interpretation of the policy by thrusting the burden
on defendants to demonstrate that the policy does not apply in
such cases. However, summary judgment requires a party to
establish the existence of each element essential to its claim.
Plaintiff's failure to show that the policy applies to employees
who do not choose to retire but are terminated for cause is, like
6

his failure to meet the application deadline, necessarily
dispositive of his claim.
Because plaintiff has established neither a genuine issue of
material fact nor legal error in the decision below, the school
district is entitled to affirmance of the district court's
summary judgment in its favor.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE SCHOOL BOARD'S PRETERMINATION PROCEDURES GAVE
PLAINTIFF ALL THE DUE PROCESS PROTECTION TO WHICH HE
WAS ENTITLED.
As plaintiff correctly notes, the United States Supreme
Court set out the essentials of pretermination due process in
Cleveland Board of Education v. LoudermiU, 470 U.S. 532, 546
(1985):

"The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or

written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the
employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of
the story." The district court concluded that the school
district complied fully with these requirements.

Plaintiff

attacks the court's decision by claiming that genuine issues of
material fact preclude summary judgment on this point. However,
the undisputed facts fully support the district court's
conclusion.
Plaintiff argues that "[i]n this case there is a factual
dispute as to whether Mr. Crittenden was given an opportunity to
present his side of the story prior to termination" (Brief of
Appellant at 7).

However, his attack is directed not at the
7

facts themselves but at the legal conclusion the court drew from
them.

At no point has plaintiff contested the facts relevant to

the court's decision:

that he was asked whether he had used

district resources for his own benefit, and he replied
affirmatively; that he was asked whether he had used district
resources to benefit another employee, and he replied
affirmatively; and that he was asked whether he had used district
resources to benefit his son, and he replied "that this use of
funds was a mistake" (R. 594, 1 5).
documented in plaintiff's own words.

These admissions are well
In a written statement

dated June 5, 1991, plaintiff explained:
Ifve reviewed Invoice No. 67379T--which I picked
up myself and am responsible for--also no. 101396.
The material used were [sic] purchased with an
Alpine School dist[.] P.O.
The material on P.0[.] No. 67379 was given to a
Friend in need--Due to financial problems. He knew
nothing about how I obtained it.
The material obtained in P.O. 101396 I had planned
to pay for--however due to my oversight--when I had the
money--I didn't take care of it. No excuse--I'm
responsible.
The material in invoice 64453--was an honest
mistake--I'd planned to [] Big A--when billed.
These three matters are my responsible [sic]--I'll
re-imburse the dist[.] & take what ever discipline I
have coming--No excuses.
R. 280-79.

Further, in an affidavit, plaintiff admitted that in

a June 5, 1991 meeting that lasted some 15 to 20 minutes (&££
R. 501, 1 3; R. 500, 1 6),
Mr. Keetch asked me if I had used a purchase order to
buy parts for my personal vehicle, an old Ford Bronco,
and I told him yes. He asked me if I had used a couple
of purchase orders to help Dave Beal on his personal
vehicle, and I told him yes.

8

R. 500, 1 4.

Plaintiff's statements, by themselves, show

Loudermill1s requisites to have been met.
Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish Powell v. Mikulecky. 891
F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1989), a case applying the Loudermill
standard, is unconvincing.

Powell, a fire fighter employed by

Bartlesville, Oklahoma, had met with fire chiefs from neighboring
jurisdictions to request that they not respond to his own
department's requests for mutual aid until after all off-duty
Bartlesville firemen had been cal]ed in for overtime. When the
Bartlesville fire chief was advised of Powell's action, he
confronted Powell and asked if he had met with the other fire
chiefs, to which Powell responded with the single word, "Yes."
Asked if he had requested them to decline signing the mutual aid
agreement, he answered, "f [I]n the form that we heard it would
be, yes.'1' Powell, 891 F.2d at 1455. The fire chief then
informed Powell that he was discharged, effective immediately.
After a subsequent question regarding the involvement of others,
Powell refused to respond further until he consulted an attorney.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that this terse exchange was sufficient
to satisfy Loudermill.

The court also held that Powell's

admission of the allegations made disclosure of their evidentiary
basis irrelevant and rendered an opportunity for further
explanation by Powell meaningless, as it "would not have
contributed to the prevention of an erroneous termination."
Powell, 891 F.2d at 1459. The pretermination due process given

9

plaintiff in this case, as shown by the evidence of record, was
greater than that accorded in Powell.
Plaintiff claims that Powell's refusal to respond to further
inquiries distinguishes Powell from the present case,
demonstrating that Powell, unlike plaintiff, was afforded an
opportunity to tell his side of the story but chose to end the
discussion.

However, a close reading of the case does not

support plaintifffs contention.

After admitting to the

questioned conduct, Powell was terminated effective immediately.
Only after terminating Powell did the fire chief attempt to
elicit additional information that bore on matters other than
Powell's own culpability, resulting in Powell's refusal to
continue the discussion.

As in Powell, plaintiff here was asked

about his questionable behavior and given an opportunity to
respond.

He admitted to two incidents and offered an explanation

for the third.

This exchange took place in the context of a

fifteen-to-twenty minute meeting at the end of which, unlike
Powell, plaintiff was not immediately terminated but asked to go
home until the district decided on an appropriate course of
action.

Later that day, plaintiff, again unlike Powell, had a

second meeting at which he was given a letter (R. 275) specifying
the reasons for the school district's actions and placing him on
suspension without pay pending termination in fifteen days.
Moreover, the letter advised him of his right to a full posttermination hearing and the procedure for obtaining it. The
school district's actions more than fulfilled the purpose of a
10

pretermination hearing as established by Loudermill:

to serve as

"an initial check against mistaken decisions--essentially, a
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the charges against the employee are true and support the
proposed action." Loudermill. 470 U.S. at 545-46.
Plaintiff's effort to distinguish Kelly v. Smith. 764 F.2d
1412 (11th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by McKinney V.
£a£j&, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994), is also unavailing.

Rather

than admitting his misconduct--failure to respond to a standby
call--Kelly attempted to excuse it by claiming he was not
scheduled to work standby, and further refused to work standby
duty for the rest of the week despite the direction of his
supervisor, whose duties included scheduling standby coverage.
The supervisor warned Kelly that refusal to work the scheduled
standby would result in his termination, but Kelly declined
standby duty and left the worksite.
oral notice of his termination.

He was subsequently given

The Eleventh Circuit held that

Kelly's pretermination due process was not violated.

Like Kelly,

plaintiff in the case at bar was confronted with his misconduct
and given the opportunity to deny or excuse it--the precise due
process measures that Loudermill demands. That he admitted,
rather than resisted, his employer's allegations has no bearing
on the sufficiency of his pretermination due process.
The fact that the terminated employees in the two other
cases plaintiff mentions received more lengthy pretermination
hearings is without the significance plaintiff attempts to place
11

on it (&££ Brief of Appellant at 9). So long as the criteria of
Loudermill are fulfilled, the length of the pretermination
hearing is irrelevant.

There is little point in prolonging a

pretermination interview when misconduct is admitted.

As the

Powell court explained,
The pretermination hearing is merely the
employee's chance to clarify the most basic
misunderstandings or to convince the employer that
termination is unwarranted. The pretermination hearing
is intended to supplement, not duplicate, the more
elaborate post-termination hearing. Because the posttermination hearing is where the definitive factfinding occurs, there is an obvious need for more
formal due process protections at that point. To
duplicate those protections at the pretermination stage
would cause unnecessary delay and expense while
diffusing the responsibility for the ultimate decision
to terminate an employee. The idea of conducting two
identical hearings runs counter to traditional
principles of adjudication.
Powell, 891 F.2d at 1458.
Plaintiff's position on appeal is much like that of the

plaintiff in Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 p.2d 751
(Utah 1982).

Horgan signed a release waiving all claims arising

from an employment relationship.

He later filed suit, seeking

additional termination compensation.

The court stated that

"[t]he movant is entitled to summary judgment only if he is
'entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' on the undisputed
facts.

Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c)."

Horgan, 657 P.2d at 752.

Observing that Horgan "attempts to create a factual dispute as to
the signing of the release by alleging that he signed under
duress" (isL. at 753), the court noted that the facts underlying
the duress claim were undisputed, leaving only a question of law
12

as to whether they constituted duress.

In the present case, the

facts underlying plaintiff's due process claim are also
undisputed, leaving only the question of whether those facts
constitute a denial of plaintiff's due process rights. As
LQudermill and 2QM£ll show, they do not.
Plaintiff's failure to show any genuine issue of material
fact or error in the district court's application of law entitles
the school district to affirmance of the summary judgment in its
favor on plaintiff's due process claim.
II. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO EARLY RETIREMENT
BECAUSE HE DID NOT MAKE TIMELY APPLICATION FOR IT.
Plaintiff's claim to early retirement benefits rests solely
on the school district's policy no. 4752 (£££ R. 569-68, 11 2027).

Under paragraph 1.7 of the policy, "[a]dministrators

wishing to retire early must make application to the
superintendent of schools by March 1, of the year they elect to
retire" (R. 165). Plaintiff's request for early retirement, a
letter to the superintendent, was dated June 6, 1991, and stamped
as received in the superintendent's office the following day
(R. 274). This tardy notification does not meet the policy's
mandatory deadline.
Rather than showing that he made a timely application for
early retirement benefits, plaintiff attempts to avoid the policy
deadline by arguing that the school district waived any argument
based on timeliness by not raising it as a defense, by not
arguing it in the summary judgment memorandum, and by stating
"that timeliness was not the reason why Mr. Crittenden's benefits
13

were denied" (Brief of Appellant at 12) . However, the evidence
of record does not support plaintiff's waiver theory.
"Waiver requires three elements:

(1) an existing right,

benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an
intention to relinquish the right." Soter's. Inc. v. Daseret
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935, 940 {Utah 1993).

Further,

"the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct." Id. at 942.
Although the supreme court rejected as separate and additional
requirements that the party's actions or conduct "'must evince in
some unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and must be
inconsistent with any other intent'" (isL. at 940) {quoting Hunter
v. Hunter. 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983)) (emphasis added in
Soter's, Inc.), it found these phrases merely redundant
elaborations of the necessary showing of intent (&££ 857 P.2d at
941).

Because the school district's actions in the district

court were, in fact, inconsistent with an intent to waive the
untimeliness of plaintiff's request as a defense, plaintiff
cannot show a distinct intent to relinquish it.
Plaintiff's waiver argument is largely based on the school
district's response to his interrogatory no. 26 (£££ Brief of
Appellant at 12-13) .3 As the school district pointed out below
(&££ R. 682-85), it is necessary to place the response in the
context of the questions being asked.
3

Interrogatory no. 25

It is of note that the materials contained in Appendices A
and B to plaintiff's brief are not of record in the case below.
However, as both interrogatory no. 25 and interrogatory no. 26
were discussed in the August 30, 1996 hearing, the school
district raises no objection to their inclusion.
14

requested the school district to "[s]et forth all facts upon
which defendant relies to substantiate its denial of paragraph 21
of plaintiff's Complaint, wherein it is alleged that the
defendant has failed and refused to allow the plaintiff to apply
for early retirement, which allegation the defendant has denied"
(Brief of Appellant at App. A, 5). The school district
responded,
Defendant never stopped plaintiff from applying for
early retirement. Plaintiff has failed to prove
otherwise. Without waiving its position as to whether
plaintiff was entitled to so-called early retirement,
defendant, through Assistant Superintendent Dr. Susan
Stone, sent plaintiff, because he specifically
requested them, the forms that constitute an employee's
application for early retirement. Also, the District
made it clear to plaintiff that it would cooperate in
any way possible to facilitate Mr. Crittenden's drawing
out his normal state retirement from the state
retirement office. However, it was the position of the
District that plaintiff did not qualify for the
District's early retirement policy since his employment
ceased as a result of a job action initiated against
him by the District.
Brief of Appellant at App. B, 13. As a follow-up to this
question, plaintiff asked the school district to "[s]tate whether
or not the plaintiff has, in fact, filled out a form for early
retirement" (Brief of Appellant at App. A, 5). In response, the
school district emphasized that whether or not he had filled out
the proper form was not at issue because he had foregone his
early retirement opportunity by engaging in criminal conduct:
As indicated in the preceding interrogatory, the
appropriate forms to apply for such early retirement
were requested by plaintiff; the defendant, through
Assistant Superintendent Stone, mailed these forms to
the plaintiff; and the forms were never sent back to
Dr[.] Stone's knowledge. However, this was not
dispositive of the District's decision to deny
15

plaintifffs request to participate in the District
early retirement program. The plaintiff, by himself
and through his attorney, communicated to defendant his
desire to participate in the District early retirement
program, and the District was well enough aware of this
desire. Defendant's denial of plaintiff's
participation in this early retirement program was not
due to any imagined irregularity with respect to
whether the forms were properly filled out, and the
defendant objects to and deplores any insinuation on
the part of the plaintiff to suggest that defendant
denied plaintiff early retirement due to a clerical
oversight in the filling out of forms. As communicated
over and over to plaintiff and his attorney by
defendant and its attorney in 1991, plaintiff failed to
qualify for district early retirement because his
employment was involuntarily terminated due to criminal
acts.
Brief of Appellant at App. B, 13-14.

The interrogatory did not

ask about, and consequently the response did not address, the
timeliness of plaintiff's request.

However, as the supreme court

has recognized, "' [m]ere silence is not a waiver unless there is
some duty or obligation to speak.'" Soter'sr Inc. r 857 P.2d at

940 (quoting Plateau Mining Co. v, Div. of State Lands and
Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 730 (Utah 1990)) (alteration in Soter's.
Inc.).

The interrogatory simply did not put plaintiffs on a duty

to speak on the issue of timeliness.
To the extent that plaintiff relies on the lack of reference
to untimeliness in the school district's answer and motion for
summary judgment, the supreme court's observation that silence
does not constitute waiver is equally applicable.

Plaintiff has

not shown untimeliness under the policy to be an affirmative
defense waived unless explicitly pleaded, nor has he shown that
failure to raise it in a motion for summary judgment precludes
the trial court from raising it sua sponte and the parties from
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arguing it at the court!s behest, as happened in this case. In
the August 28, 1996 hearing on summary judgment, the court
remarked, "The policy on its face says that, 'administrators
wishing to retire early must make their election by March l.1
That's Section 1.7" (R. 657). The following exchange ensued:
MR. PETERSEN: Okay, let me address that issue,
your Honor. We asked them specifically that in an
interrogatory, and they said that it didn't apply.
That is not the reason he was denied early retirement.
They said in an answer to interrogatory the reason
we're denying early retirement is because he was
terminated for cause.
THE COURT: So you think that I should ignore
Section 1.7 because you believe they are actually
ignoring 1.7?
MR. PETERSEN: Correct.
R. 657-58.

In the hearing, plaintiff's counsel did not specify

the interrogatory to which he was referring.
Rather than responding immediately, the school district's
attorney returned to his office to review the answers to
plaintiff's interrogatories (R. 681/. As he explained to the
court in the subsequent hearing,
So what happened is yesterday afternoon or
yesterday morning I started reviewing all the answers
to interrogatories. I couldn't figure out which one
counsel was talking about. I called counsel on the
phone, and he told me he was referring to interrogatory
No. 26. So you can see there, your Honor, it's tab No.
3.
I read it through, and at that point I determined
that the Court was misinformed [by plaintiff's
counsel]. And so that's when I got on the line with
the Court, and that's why we're having this hearing.
R. 682. He then proceeded to explain the response to
interrogatory no. 26 in detail (R. 682-85), and concluded,
Now I guess counsel is reasoning from that
interrogatory answer that somehow we had waived the
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March 1st deadline, but what we did again, is we said,
"We1re not getting hung up on the fact that you never
filled out a form." We didn't waive the March 1st
issue. We didn't say, "We're not hung up on the fact
that you didn't file by March 1st, [*] and we reiterated
that the reason we let you go was because you were
terminated.[]
Now maybe counsel can argue that that was--that he
can say, "Well, you didn't affirmatively say that
you--you didn't affirmatively refer to the March 1
issue." Well, your Honor, that does not constitute a
waiver, and that's what I wanted to get before the
Court today.
Because the Court has focused on this issue and
because of the way the discussion has developed as we
have argued this motion, I think it's appropriate to
look at that issue.
R. 685-86.

Plaintiff's counsel was given a full opportunity to

respond, but chose not to directly address the timeliness issue
(R. 690-93) .
As this Court has held, an appellate court "may affirm the
trial court's ruling on any proper ground as long as there is
evidence in the record supporting such an affirmance." State v.
MontQya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah App. 1997); accord White v.
Deseelhorstr 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994).

In addition to the

hearing transcripts cited above, other evidence of record in this
case supports affirmance of the district court's decision that
plaintiff's request for early retirement benefits was untimely.
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the district
included its response to plaintiff's request for early retirement
benefits, a letter from the superintendent dated June 25, 1991.
The letter stated as follows:
This letter will inform you of the Alpine School
District's intention to deny your request for early
retirement benefits and supplemental health insurance
benefits as provided in Policies #4750 and #4752. It
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is the district's position that you are ineligible for
either of the benefits under the express terms of the
policies. These benefits are available only to
retiring employees, and you did not retire but were
suspended and notified of involuntary termination for

cause. In addition, you failed to comply with the
District's application procedure for the granting of
early retirement benefits in that you did not notify
the District by March l. Also, with respect to
supplemental health insurance benefits, you have not
yet attained age 65. For these reasons the District
has determined to deny both of your requests.
R. 272 (emphasis supplied).

Moreover, in his deposition, the

superintendent was asked if he was still relying on the March 1
deadline as one of the reasons for denial of early retirement
benefits and responded, "fIn some measure, but I will say that it
does not have the weight for me that it did at that time1"
(R. 680). Even this qualified answer demonstrates that at the
time the school district made its determination, plaintiff!s
failure to meet the March 1 deadline was a significant reason for
the denial. That it has since been overshadowed in importance by
plaintiff's criminal conduct does not make it less so.
In short, it is clear from the record that the timeliness of
plaintiff's request for early retirement benefits was at issue
below; it is also clear that the undisputed evidence shows the
request to have been untimely.

Plaintiff has provided no

authority for his proposition that the district court was not
entitled to rely on this ground as dispositive and has failed to
demonstrate that the school district had a distinct intent to
waive the issue.

These facts warrant affirmance of the district

court's grant of summary judgment on this issue for the school
district.
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III. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT HAVE A VESTED RIGHT OR
PROTECTABLE PROPERTY INTEREST IN EARLY RETIREMENT
BENEFITS UNDER POLICY NO. 4752.
Plaintiff advances several additional theories to justify
his claimed entitlement to early retirement benefits under policy
no. 4752.

He argues that his right to benefits became vested by

virtue of his age and years of service alone. He contends that
the policy does not explicitly exclude employees terminated for
criminal conduct.

He alleges a lack of due process prior to the

denial of benefits.

Finally, he asserts that the district

court's decision amounts to judicial legislation.

Each of these

arguments is without merit.
Although he characterizes his right to early retirement as
Vested/ plaintiff neither defines the term nor cites to
authorities which do.

Research has disclosed no Utah cases

scrutinizing the word's meaning.

However, according to Black1S

Law Dictionary, Vested" means
[f]ixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having
the character or given the rights of absolute
ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated
by a condition precedent. Rights are Vested" when
right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become
property of some particular person or persons as
present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits,
or contingent interest in property founded on
anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not
constitute Vested right."
Black's Law Dictionary 1563 (6th ed. 1990).

A Vested pension"

is one in which
an employee (or his or her estate) has rights to all
the benefits purchased with the employer's
contributions to the plan even if the employee is not
employed by this employer at the time of retirement.
One in which the right to be paid is not subject to
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forfeiture if the employment relationship terminates
before the employee retires.
Id. Under these definitions, plaintiff's claim must fail.
Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence of record disputing
that his right to early retirement benefits is contingent or
subject to defeat by a condition precedent, such as application
by the mandatory deadline (£££ discussion in Point II, above).
He has not shown that the right to early retirement benefits had
become his property as a present interest prior to his suspension
and termination.

At most, he has shown that policy no. 4752 gave

him a right to apply for early retirement benefits--an
opportunity in which the school district fully cooperated,
providing the appropriate forms at plaintiff's request. See
Brief of Appellant at Appendix B, 13-14.
Moreover, plaintiff has not shown, nor can he show, that
policy no. 4752 is a vested pension plan as defined above. There
is no evidence that the employer made contributions to a plan or
purchased benefits pursuant to the policy.

Likewise, there is no

evidence that an employee is entitled to benefits under the
policy even if he no longer works for the school district at the
time of retirement; in fact, the policy's language contradicts
such an interpretation.

Section 1.1 targets long-term

administrators "who find it increasingly difficult to continue
their employment with the district" (R. 165; emphasis supplied)
and states, "This policy is adopted to provide these
administrators an opportunity to retire early" (idLJ

At the time

plaintiff made his request, he was under unpaid suspension
21

pending termination.

Because his employment could not have

continued under these circumstances, he "is not the type of
employee for whom this policy was implemented" (R. 583) , as the
court correctly held.

Consequently, any right to benefits under

the policy was subject to forfeiture on termination, unlike a
vested benefit.

It is the element of vesting that differentiates

early retirement under policy no. 4752 from the state retirement
pension that plaintiff is currently receiving, and from the
retirement benefits at issue in the three cases plaintiff cites
to support his argument.

Each of these cases is distinguishable

from the case at bar.
In Auerbach's. Inc. v. Kimball. 572 P.2d 376 (Utah 1977),
Kimball had been promised a pension of $50.00 per month for life
on fulfilling only two conditions:

20 years of employment with

Auerbachfs, and continued employment with the company until age
65.

The court analyzed the promise as a unilateral contract

fulfilled by performance of the conditions, reversed the summary
judgment in favor of Auerbach's, and remanded the case for trial.
In the present case, there is no promise of a fixed benefit
simply on reaching a given age and length of service; instead,
there is an opportunity to apply for benefits in lieu of
continuing employment, based on a timely notification that
plaintiff neglected to make.

Plaintiff does not stand in the

same position as employee Kimball.
The remaining two cases are also inapposite.

Schofield v.

Zion's Mercantile Institution, 85 Utah 281, 39 P.2d 342 (1934),
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does not address pending benefits but the diminution of benefits
already fixed by written agreement and being paid to retirees, in
contrast to plaintiff's circumstances,

Ellis v. Utah State

Retirement Board, 757 p.2d 882 (Utah App. 1988), a££!d, 783 p.2d
540 (Utah 1989), deals with disability retirement benefits. In
determining that Ellis had no vested right to benefits, the court
reviewed the supreme court's analysis of vested rights in Driggs
v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 142 P.2d
657 (Utah 1943).

The issue in Driggs, as in Schofielfl, was

whether an employer--this time, the state--could unilaterally
reduce the amount of a pension for which Driggs had already
qualified and which he was receiving on a continuing basis. The
Ellis court summarized the supreme court's position in Driggs as
follows:
an employee who receives a mere gratuitous allowance
awarded for appreciation of past services has no vested
rights in the allowance and it is terminable at will.
On the other hand, when a retired employee had made the
requisite contributions and had satisfied all
conditions precedent to his benefits, then the employee
had a "vested right" in his retirement benefits as
provided by the statute at the time of his retirement
and a subsequent amendment could not reduce the amount
of benefits to which the employee was entitled.
Ellis, 757 P.2d at 886 (citation omitted).

Plaintiff's truncated

quotation of this language for the general proposition that an
employee has a vested right to benefits when he has fulfilled all
conditions precedent (see Brief of Appellant at 10) fails to
distinguish between his circumstances and the divestiture of an
ongoing benefit that Driggs addressed, as well as ignoring the
necessity of a timely application as a condition precedent to
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receiving the early retirement benefits to which plaintiff lays
claim.

Further, unlike Driggs, plaintiff made no contributions

to the plan under which he maintains a right to benefits.
Plaintiffls asserted denial of due process before early
retirement benefits were denied is improperly raised for the
first time on appeal. No due process claim with respect to these
benefits was articulated in the court below.

"To preserve a

substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely bring the issue
to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits." LeBaron & Assocs. v.
Rebel Enters.r 823 P.2d 479, 482-83 (Utah App. 1991) (footnote
omitted) ; see also Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ, 797
P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990) ("With limited exceptions, the practice
of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised
for the first time on appeal"); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 77
(Utah App. 1990) ("As the Utah appellate courts have reiterated
many times, we generally will not consider an issue, even a
constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal for the
first time") . Moreover, as established above, plaintiff has
failed to show a protectible property interest to which due
process applies.
Finally, plaintiff argues that it is not the court's proper
function to construe policy no. 4752 expansively to protect the
school district.

In doing so, he ignores clear precedent giving

latitude to a school district's interpretation of its own policy.
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As the supreme court stated just last year in E.M. v. Briggs. 922
P.2d 754 (Utah 1996),
On two prior occasions, we have discussed the
latitude a reviewing court should give a school board's
interpretation of its own policies. In Elwell v. Board
of Education,
626 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah 1981), we stated:
It should be here noted that the management,
supervision and determinations of policy are the
prerogative and the responsibility of the school
officials; and that the courts should be reluctant
to enter therein; and indeed should not do so
unless it is shown that the complainant was in
some manner deprived of due process of law, or
that the action of the board was so entirely
without justification thnt it must be deemed
capricious and arbitrary.
(Footnote omitted.) We reached the same result in
Espinal v. Salt Lake City Board of Education,
797 P.2d
412, 413-14 (Utah 1990), stating, "fIt is the policy of
the law not to favor limitations on the powers of
[boards of education], but rather to give [them] a free
hand to function within the sphere of [their]
responsibilities.1" Id. at 414 (quoting Ricker v.
Board of Educ,
16 Utah 2d 106, 110-11, 396 P.2d 416,
420 (1964)) .
E.M.e 922 P.2d at 757. The court applied this latitude to uphold
the school district's reasonable interpretation of its own policy
as permitting use of a disciplinary sanction that was not
specified in the policy but fell within the range of severity
defined by the policy's extremes.
Plaintiff has identified no language in policy no. 4752 that
explicitly or implicitly permits early retirement to one whose
continued employment has already been rejected for misconduct.
By contrast, it is implicit in the policy that the qualifying
employee could continue to work if he chose to do so: section
1.3.1 is directed to those who meet plaintiff's age and service
requirements and "choose to retire early" (R. 165). One who,
25

like plaintiff, is under suspension and pending termination is no
longer in a position to elect early retirement.

For the court to

construe the policy against the school district's reasonable
interpretation to include employees being terminated for cause
would be to engage in the very judicial legislation that
plaintiff deplores.
Because plaintiff has failed to show vesting of or
entitlement to early retirement benefits under policy no. 4752,
the district court's summary judgment for the school district on
this issue merits this Court's affirmance.

CONCLUSION
In terminating plaintiff's employment, the school district
gave him oral notice of the reasons for the proposed termination
and an opportunity to respond to them.

Plaintiff admitted to

misappropriating district funds in two instances, and offered an
explanation for the third.

After considering the matter further,

the district provided plaintiff with a letter placing him on
unpaid suspension pending termination, advising him of the
reasons for its action, and informing him of the procedure for
obtaining further review.

Due process requires nothing more.

The school district relied on both plaintiff's criminal
misconduct and the untimeliness of his notification that he
desired early retirement in denying him benefits under policy no.
4752.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated timely notice. Nor has he

shown the district's interpretation of its policy to be arbitrary
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or capricious; rather, its language implicitly requires that an
employee be qualified to continue employment in order to obtain
early retirement benefits. Because plaintiff was incapable of
continuing his employment due to his suspension and pending
termination, the denial of benefits is fully warranted by policy.
For these reasons, as more fully explained above, Alpine
School district respectfully requests the Court to affirm the
district court's grant of summary judgment in its favor.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Defendant does not believe oral argument is necessary to the
proper disposition of this case. However, defendant wishes to
participate if oral argument is ordered by the Court. Defendant
does not request a published opinion.
Dated this

| */ IL

day of August, 1997.

Nancy a. Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
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